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Abstract During 2007 and 2008 synthetic biology moved
from the manifesto stage to research programs. As of 2009,
synthetic biology is ramifying; to ramify means to produce
differentiated trajectories from previous determinations.
From its inception, most of the players in synthetic biology
agreed on the need for (a) rationalized design and con-
struction of new biological parts, devices, and systems as
well as (b) the re-design of natural biological systems for
speciﬁed purposes, and that (c) the versatility of designed
biological systems makes them suitable to address such
challenges as renewable energy, the production of inex-
pensive drugs, and environmental remediation, as well as
providing a catalyst for further growth of biotechnology.
What is understood by these goals, however, is diverse.
Those assorted understandings are currently contributing to
different ramiﬁcations of synthetic biology. The Berkeley
Human Practices Lab, led by Paul Rabinow, is currently
devoting its efforts to documenting and analyzing these
ramiﬁcations as they emerge.
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What is synthetic biology? Just a few years ago this
question could not have been answered with any degree of
speciﬁcity. Rather, for a small group of researchers the
question was: What do we want synthetic biology to be? At
that point, synthetic biology existed as informally con-
nected visions of how one might make biological engi-
neering robust and standardized. During 2006 and 2007
two major obstacles were cleared for testing whether, and
if so, how that imagined discipline could be made opera-
tional. First, the stirring, if inchoate, visions for synthetic
biology were turned into crisp manifestos: discursively
coherent, power-point friendly, declamations of broad
programmatic objectives. The manifestos included a sketch
of preliminary design principles conceived to realize the
initial steps. Second, the manifestos, in turn, were crafted
into proposals for new research venues and infrastructures
capable of new modes of collaboration and production.
In 2006 Jay Keasling, a professor of chemistry at UC
Berkeley, with colleagues at MIT, Harvard, UCSF, and
Prairie View A&M, submitted a proposal to the National
Science Foundation for an Engineering Research Center in
synthetic biology—SynBERC (http://www.synberc.org).
SynBERC’s stated goals were grand, to say the least: to
turn biology into a full-ﬂedged engineering discipline, usu-
allyimaginedontheanalogyofelectricalengineering.Or,as
the SynBERC Principals sometimes put it, the challenge is
to make biology, ‘‘easy to engineer’’ by establishing and
circulating standardized materials and know-how.
The SynBERC proposal was enthusiastically received
by ofﬁcials at the NSF. Before making the ofﬁcial award,
however, NSF ofﬁcials informed Jay Keasling, a professor
of chemistry at UC Berkeley and the future director of the
center, that the award was contingent on including an
‘‘ethics’’ component. Keasling et al. were perfectly willing
to accept this proposal although clearly neither the NSF nor
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Center had a very clear or well-formulated idea about what
such a component would look like, or what it would do.
Subsequently, the authors of this paper were invited to take
up the challenge of designing and experimenting with new
forms of collaboration between the life sciences and the
human sciences, including ethics. Concurring with the
diagnoses of colleagues from ethics and the social studies
of science, we agreed that the time seemed ripe to see
whether one form or another of ‘‘post-ELSI’’ ethics—
conducted alongside of and collaboratively with biologists
and engineers—could be invented and implemented for
synthetic biology (Khushf 2007; Jasanoff 2005; Nowotny
et al. 2001; Gibbons 1999). We proposed the title of
Human Practices as a substitute for ‘‘ethical and social
consequences.’’ In late 2006, ‘‘Human Practices’’ ofﬁcially
became a core research thrust of the Center.
From the outset Human Practices has been designed to
focus on reciprocal interfaces between and among syn-
thetic biology and economic, political, and cultural forces,
with particular attention to questions of security, new
organizational forms, ethics and industrial relations. With
others, we have argued that to the extent that its technical
goals are achieved, synthetic biology is likely to play a
formative role in contemporary human life (Purnick and
Weiss 2009; Yearly 2009; O’Malley et al. 2008; Rabinow
and Bennett 2007). As such, following the mandate of
funders and other thoughtful observers, we insist that
technical virtuosity per se cannot be the only measure of
success for SynBERC, or for synthetic biology more
broadly. Rather, integral to the worth and distinctiveness of
synthetic biology is the possibility of elaborating a framing
of how science can be undertaken and organized as a
comprehensive Human Practice from the outset (Bedau and
Parke 2008; Schmidt et al. 2009). But how to make these
efforts collaborative remains problematic and the subject of
muted contestation.
During 2007 and 2008, efforts at SynBERC (and in other
allied venues) shifted from writing and disseminating
manifestos and grant proposals to facing the challenges of
animating sustained research programs. Investigators began
confronting the challenge of making synthetic biology into
more than a brand and more than a fundable vision. As the
shift from manifestos to research programs has advanced,
diverse, if overlapping, scientiﬁc and organizational strat-
egies operating under the generic label of synthetic biology
have emerged, and salient differences among these strate-
gies are becoming clear. Moreover, these diverse technical
and organizational strategies call for corollary strategies for
Human Practices engagement. Given the lessons learned
from several decades of the social and anthropological
study of science, the need for such adjusted ethical and
social scientiﬁc strategies comes as no surprise. Science
Studies, after all, has demonstrated that the goals and
practices of research are oriented and shaped by broader
concerns from the outset (Jasanoff 2005; Nowotny et al.
2001; Gibbons 1999). As synthetic biology shifts from
manifestos to research programs, its initial directions, dis-
tinctiveness and results can now begin to be speciﬁed and
characterized (Purnick and Weiss 2009; Rabinow and
Bennett 2008a). As such, the design speciﬁcations needed
for appropriate corollary developments in Human Practices
can now be speciﬁed as well (O’Malley et al. 2008; Schmidt
et al. 2009; Rabinow and Bennett 2008b).
In search of synthetic biology: four research programs
From its inception up to the present, it has been proposed
that synthetic biology is one area of post-genomics ripe for
designing and inventing distinctive forms for Human
Practices (Andrianantoandro et al. 2006; Baker et al. 2006;
Endy 2005; Church 2005). Most of the players in this
nascent ﬁeld agree on the need for (a) rationalized design
and construction of new biological parts, devices, and
systems as well as (b) the re-design of natural biological
systems for speciﬁed purposes, and that (c) the versatility
of designed biological systems makes them ideally suited
to solve challenges in renewable energy, the production of
inexpensive drugs, and environmental remediation, as well
as providing a catalyst for further growth of biotechnology.
What is understood by these goals, however, is quite
diverse (Purnick and Weiss 2009; Ross and Arkin 2009;
Andrianantoandro et al. 2006). Those assorted understand-
ings are currently contributing to different ramiﬁcations of
synthetic biology—ramiﬁcations that are not only techni-
cally and organizationally signiﬁcant, but ethically, indus-
trially, politically, and environmentally signiﬁcant as well.
In order to clarify this situation, we distinguish at least four
design and composition strategies currently operating under
the name of synthetic biology: parts, pathways, genomes,
and systems. In the section that follows we provide a
characterization of each these four strategies, ﬁrst consid-
ering their biological research programs. Then, we provide
a synopsis of efforts within these programs that fall under
the Human Practices rubric. We pay special attention to
externalities (those costs expected to be paid by someone
else) as well as critical limitations (the—often unacknowl-
edged—range of structural capacities and incapacities) of
each research strategy.
We argue that the challenge of inventing new forms for
synthetic biology, forms that incorporate collaboration with
human scientists from the outset, cannot be met unless and
until salient differences among and across research strate-
gies are speciﬁed. We should note for the reader that the
four strategies analyzed here are not exhaustive of current
100 P. Rabinow, G. Bennett
123research in synthetic biology (Purnick and Weiss 2009;
Schmidt et al. 2009; O’Malley et al. 2008). We have picked
out those strategies which are most directly connected to
our efforts at SynBERC. Moreover, we are presenting these
strategic orientations as ‘‘ideal types.’’ Ideal types are
analytic devices constructed so as to sharpen differences in
order to make emergent trends easier to characterize. With
a diagnostic overview of the objects, methods and purposes
in place, researchers will be in a better position to carry out
Human Practices inquiry (Weber 1949).
Parts
The ﬁrst and most widely publicized research strategy has
been formulated by researchers at MIT, and is exempliﬁed
by the BioBricks Foundation. This approach has two goals.
The ﬁrst goal is to transform biology into a fully standard-
ized and abstracted engineering discipline understood in a
literal sense on the analogy of electrical and computer
engineering. The second goal, in line with the ﬁrst, is to
reduce biological systems to modular and additive parts,
which can be combined in a linear fashion to form more
complex functional units (Canton et al. 2008; Lucks et al.
2008; Endy 2005).
1 Such standardized biological parts are
the principle objects of interest and investment. The success
of this approach depends on the ability to black-box the
evolutionary contingency and non-linear dynamics of
underlying biology, just as, or so the analogy runs, the
development of computer software succeeded in black-
boxing micro-physics.
In SynBERC, responsibility for designing the parts-
based approach—and publicizing it—has been taken up by
engineers (electrical and civil) at MIT and Stanford, espe-
cially Tom Knight and Drew Endy. A unique contribution
of their ‘‘Legos’’ approach has been the development of the
‘‘BioBricks’’ standard as well as the registry of standardized
parts (http://parts.mit.edu). The principle vehicle for the
expansion and legitimation of this approach is MIT’s annual
International Genetically Engineered Machines (iGEM)
competition. iGEM brings together a growing international
set of undergraduate research teamswhose projects, in order
to qualify, must meet the BioBricks design standardization
criteria, and, to qualify for awards, whose parts must be
deposited in the BioBricks registry. The iGEM competition
constitutes the central venue for establishing the parts-based
approach as the norm for synthetic biology.
The manifestos of the BioBricks approach imagine and
plot a comprehensive remaking of the biological sciences.
Moving from the scale and scope of their guiding vision to
more mundane experimental results has encountered
research obstacles. Not only are biological processes more
difﬁcult to black-box in the lab than in discourse (Lucks
et al. 2008; Arkin 2008), but the original and innovative
venue lacks the power to enforce its standards. It seems
clear that an adequately ﬁnanced ‘‘parts fab’’ will be
required if the BioBricks approach is to be fully vetted and
its range of applicability tested. Such a parts fab would be a
stable, industrial scale organization with a clear mandate to
produce standardized parts (Baker et al. 2006). It would
presumably be staffed predominantly with technicians, not
undergraduates or post-docs.
Human practices: regulated commons
The BioBricks vision and its manifestos has been the most
comprehensive and inclusive of Human Practices consid-
erations. It explicitly recognizes the need for innovative
rethinking of Intellectual Property issues, security con-
cerns, organizational form, and ethics. This vision turns on
the idea that in order for synthetic biology to be success-
fully realized an ethos of openness and collaboration must
be fostered from the outset, and venues created for its
implementation (Rai and Boyle 2007; Bugl et al. 2007).
A primary externality of the parts approach is that there
is no enforcement mechanism connected to the ethos it
proposes as the guiding feature of synthetic biology’s
vision. In the initial stages the expansion of practices of
openness and sharing has been dependent on the good will
of participants, although attention is beginning to be paid to
the pragmatics of organizational enforcement (Ganguli-
Mitra et al. 2009). One key critical limitation of the
BioBricks approach is its own tacit resistance to estab-
lishing a venue in which specialists from the human and
socials sciences can play a collaborative and productive
role as equal partners. Perhaps a more intransigent obstacle
to realizing the ethos of openness is the fact that many of
the major players are currently invested in pursuing other
IP commitments (O’Malley et al. 2008).
Pathways
The ﬁrst completed project that showed that synthetic biol-
ogy could be a robust and effective approach is the Keasling
lab’s design of microbial pathways for the production of the
precursor to an anti-malaria molecule, artemesinin (Ro et al.
2006). Although the Keasling lab is committed publically to
supporting the parts-based approach to synthetic biology, the
artemesinin research program was constituted on a different
analogical basis. If the analogical basis of the BioBricks
1 As MIT’s part’s registry puts it, as an: ‘‘Assembly of parts into
devices and systems is being performed using traditional cloning
techniques with a set of restriction sites that allow easy composition
of composite devices that, in turn, can themselves be used as parts.
Simultaneous parallel assembly lets us build many biological systems
quickly’’ http://www.parts.mit.edu.
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construct are standard biological parts, the analogical basis of
the Keasling lab’s approach (an approach shared by the
Prather Lab at MIT, among others), is industrial chemistry
transferred into the cell (i.e. ‘‘microbial chemical factories’’)
and the core objects, on which it focuses its attention and its
resources, and around which it has constructed its facility, are
enzymatic pathways (Martin et al. 2003, 2009).
Adistinctive aspect oftheKeaslingapproachisitsvenue.
The artemesinin project, like Keasling’s current work on
biofuels (Steen et al. 2008), is set within an institutional
framework that allows research to be directly ramiﬁed into
practical solutions to real world problems. The artemesinin
project was organized as a collaborative endeavor by spe-
cialists from the Keasling lab at UC Berkeley, the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation, One World Health, and Amyris
Biotechnology. This approach not only enabled the design
and development new microbial pathways in yeast (and E.
coli), but required that essential connections be fashioned
from the outset among and between strategic partners. As a
result this endeavor set a precedent for the organization of
synthetic biology as a collaborative and multi-institutional
approach to addressing pressing real world problems. This
same approach is now being applied to biofuels at the
Keasling-directed Joint Bio-Energy Institute.
A deﬁning characteristic of this pathways based
approach is the study of evolutionary processes so that
dynamics such as ﬁtness and variation can be leveraged as
part of the design toolkit (Yoshikuni and Keasling 2007).
Rather than black-boxing biological complexity, evolu-
tionary processes, and variation this approach embraces
them in order to produce speciﬁed molecular compounds in
an efﬁcient and scalable manner.
If the power of this approach is its problem driven focus
on pathways, this is also its limitation. The production of
enzymes and the reconstruction of pathway dynamics are
only one set of processes to be learned from evolution.
Although this approach has proven successful in producing
high-value compounds such as artemesinin, at present it is
not formulating a research program that squarely addresses
many of the challenges of constructing yet more complex
devices and systems (Purnick and Weiss 2009; Ross and
Arkin 2009). This remark is not a criticism, only an
observation as to the form and emphasis of the pathways
approach.
Human practices: cooperative specialists
Currently, the Human Practices dimension of the pathways
approach recognizes the need to engage specialists for
managing ﬁnancial and regulatory matters as well as the
work of developing deliverables. The strength of Keasling’s
venue is that it considers and accounts for this need by
building pathways between the lab and other institutions
from the outset such that once the scientiﬁc milestones have
been reached an apparatus is in place for the translation of
the designed pathways into effective solutions.
This arrangement, however, implies an externality.I t
assumes a cooperative division of labor in which its sci-
entiﬁc work assumes a linear and unidirectional relation to
the rest of the pathway. The other research departments of
Keasling’s venues have been designed such that develop-
ments in any one area of research can rapidly be accounted
for and adjusted to in the other areas of research. Unlike
these biological research and engineering departments,
those specialists tasked with managing Human Practices
issues are downstream and external to the biological
research. The price to be paid for such an externality is that
while the strength of Keasling’s cooperative approach is the
anticipation of how to move from the lab to deliverables, its
weakness is that if these pathways prove inadequate, there is
no available internal mechanism for adjustment.
The success of the artemesinin project covers over the
fact that these venues are not as ﬂexible and agile as the
actors believe them to be. As such, what is taken to be an
acceptable externality in one case—i.e. a cooperative
pathway—is structurally assumed to be sufﬁcient in other
cases. A key Human Practices critical limitation of the
cooperatively constructed pathways approach is that it is
not collaborative. By this we mean if the original division
of problem areas and specialties proves to be insufﬁciently
agile or ﬂexible, there is no internal mechanism to rethink
and implement rapid adjustments. This arrangement is
likely to prove troublesome in areas where the scientiﬁc
product, the regulatory challenges, the ﬁnancing, the mode
and ramiﬁcations of applications, and their inter-connec-
tions are not known in advance. For example, artemesinin
was identiﬁed from the start as the malaria molecule of
choice, the appropriate funding was non-commercial, and a
non-governmental agency (experienced in bio-tech based
health care delivery in developing countries) was available.
Had any part of this pathway not been already in place,
more Human Practices input would have been required. By
contrast, in an area such a biofuels where none of the
components of the proposed pathways are already in place,
and where the contours of the ﬁeld of ramiﬁcations is
largely unknown, the smoothness of the previous opera-
tions is unlikely to be replicated. In sum, a cooperative
state of affairs, taken as sufﬁcient for all cases, becomes a
critical limitation and not only an externality.
Genomes
Another type of research program focuses on the design and
construction of ‘‘minimal cells.’’ This self-description,
however, is somewhat misleading. Actually, the privileged
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synthetic genomes, which are designed, modiﬁed, recon-
structed, and synthesized (Gibson et al. 2008; Gabaldon
et al. 2008; Forster and Church 2006). The analogical basis
oftheseprogramsiscloning.Thegoalistofashion synthetic
genomes so that they can be inserted into and function
withinexistingcellular hosts.Thepurposeistoleveragecell
functions, including mechanisms of self-reproduction and
the capacity for adaptation. This whole-genome approach to
synthetic biology is predicated on the assumption that
existing cellular machinery will function as a predictable
and (ultimately) non-problematic biological chassis for
these designed genomes. A common feature of these
approaches is the claim that enough is known (or will be
known) about evolutionary processes and genomic biology
to proceed with the construction of synthetic genomes
designed for speciﬁed functions. It is anticipated that gen-
omes would be versatile as a refactoring machine for syn-
thetic biology.
Two examples of labs using this strategy are those of
George Church at Harvard Medical School and the J. Craig
Venter Institute. Church, a PI in SynBERC, is directing a
project to design and construct a minimal genome ‘‘capable
of replication and evolution, fed only by small molecule
nutrients’’ (Forster and Church 2006). Given what has been
learned from the genome sequencing projects and from the
study of directed evolution, the Church lab is attempting to
build a minimal genome that can function as a safe and
controllable chassis (Tian et al. 2004). Church’s minimal
genome offers at least two immediate beneﬁts to synthetic
biology. First, it demonstrates a strategy for minimizing the
scale of complexity in engineering design. Second, from
the outset, it is attentive to issues of safety; it has built-in
internal control mechanisms based on new nucleotides
(that don’t exist naturally) that the lab has designed spe-
ciﬁcally for this purpose.
The J. Craig Venter Institute has set as its goal the con-
struction of artiﬁcial genomes that serve as multi-ﬂexed
platforms capable of receiving (and continuing to function
with) a series of speciﬁc molecular inserts—genetic ‘‘cas-
settes’’ carrying designed functions. The goal, one might
say, is to build a prototype organic robot. The Venter
Institute has devoted time and resources to charting a wide
range of variation and diversity existing in the wild. They
have demonstrated that there is an existing dynamic
exchange of molecular material in evolutionary regulated
milieus. The documentation of these processes is normative
in its use of such milieus to argue that a type of genomic
experimentation is a naturally occurring phenomenon going
on in the wild with salutary evolutionary consequences
(Venter 2007). The Venter design and research strategy—as
well as its’ manifestos—is at the opposite pole of BioBricks
within synthetic biology’s current ﬁeld of options. Instead
of black-boxing biological processes, Venter’s Institute
approaches evolutionary resources as a vast lab within
which a nearly inﬁnite number of experiments past and
present provide invaluable lessons of what nature has
allowed is taking place.
2
Human practices: safety-by-design
Those currently working on the design of synthetic and
artiﬁcial genomes devote attention and resources to issues
of safety and security, and what they take to be attendant
social consequences. Their strategy for addressing these
Human Practices concerns can be called ‘‘safety-by-
design.’’
3 There is an explicit effort to design genomes in
such a manner so as to maximum control over their func-
tionality. Design attention is devoted to minimizing the risk
of survival or re-programmability outside of the lab. Safety-
by-design’s purpose is the fabricate genomes that when
circulated, the effects, both negative and positive, can be
accounted for and prepared for in advance (Garﬁnkel et al.
2007; Church 2005).
The key externality of this approach is that it can only
address those aspects of the security challenge that are
amenable to technological safeguards (Ganguli-Mitra et al.
2009). Security issues are framed as a problem of dual-use
in which the principle challenge arises from the threat of
‘‘bad’’ actors ‘‘misusing’’ technologies created for benevo-
lent purposes. This framing is taken to call for a techno-
logical response by existing specialists: can a biological
chassis be designed in such a way that it cannot be subse-
quently ‘‘misused’’? Other signiﬁcant aspects of biosecuri-
ty, such as challenges associated with the current political
milieu, or preparation for unexpected events, which are not
amenable to safety-by-design, are externalized.
To the extent that this externality is taken to be generally
sufﬁcient, it becomes a critical limitation. That is to say,
safety-by-design becomes a critical limitation when it is held
that the salient security challenges can be mitigated ade-
quately through technical means, police procedures among
and between labs, and trust in the expertise and character of
current specialists. Once this externality becomes a critical
limitation there are no other human practices resources
within this venue readily available for responding to other
unexpected and unpredicted ramiﬁcations.
2 Existing structures and processes can be either directly taken up or
refashioned. Like Keasling, Venter wants to use organisms to produce
speciﬁc molecules of interest. It is a step beyond redesigning
pathways—redesigning genomes is an attempt to control all of the
coding and reproduction operation.
3 The expression comes from Chris Kelty and Elise McCarthy, in
their unpublished working paper, ‘‘Responsibility in Nanotechnology
(1)’’.
Ethical ramiﬁcations 2009 103
123Safety-by-design is an attempt to extend self-governance
models developed by the 1974 Asilomar conference and its
successors. However, the success in managing ‘‘experi-
ments of concern’’ depends on the kinds of venues devel-
oped in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. The scientiﬁc,
industrial, and political milieus today are strikingly differ-
ent. Given the internet and the globalization of science,
access to materials and specialized knowledge is wide-
spread. As such, the technical safeguards being developed
by those designing genomes can only have limited efﬁcacy.
To the extent that these technical procedures give the illu-
sion that security issues amount to the management of
‘‘experiments of concern,’’ they themselves function mis-
leadingly as ‘‘experiments of reassurance,’’ to coin a phrase.
We hold that taking such experiments of reassurance as
sufﬁcient, explicitly or otherwise, constitutes the signiﬁcant
critical limitation of a safety-by-design approach.
Systems
The fourth type of approach in synthetic biology takes as its
targeted object neither parts, pathways, nor genomes.
Rather, the object of scientiﬁc and technological interest is a
biological system (often multi-cellular) understood in an
evolutionary milieu. Here the aim of syntheticbiologyisnot
only to produce intra-cellular functions, but includes the
goal of intervention and redesign of whole-cell and multi-
cellular systems as well. Its goal is to discover the extent to
which abstraction and standardization of bioengineering is
feasible at the systems level. New design and composition
techniques as well as collaborative strategies are required to
pose the question of standardization and abstraction in a
manner that will allow them to be approached experimen-
tally (Purnick and Weiss 2009; Ross and Arkin 2009;
Rasmussen et al. 2008).
This approach proceeds by explicitly taking into account
the critical limitations of the analogies at work in the other
approaches. It acknowledges the heuristic value of analo-
gies from other engineering domains for provisional ori-
entation and initial design. However, it understands that the
use of analogies can be mis-leading. It follows that, at the
level of specifying design parameters, attention must be
paid to the limits of dominant analogies in synthetic biology
(computer engineering, microbial chemical factories,
cloning) and the extent to which they apply to biological
systems.
The Ron Weiss lab at MIT and the Arkin and Anderson
Labs at UC Berkeley are prime examples of the systems
approach in synthetic biology. Many of the so-called
‘‘protocell’’ projects—efforts to design and build minimal
cells—are characteristic of this approach as well (Stano
et al. 2008). A shared strategy across these labs is to test
familiar engineering goals such as standardization,
decoupling, abstraction, predictability, and reliability for
biology. The problem is: given the seeming complexity and
idiosyncrasy of cellular context, the challenge is to account
for, and abstract from, the distinctive characteristics of
living systems and to formulate principles of design
accordingly (Purnick and Weiss 2009; Lucks et al. 2008;
Anderson et al. 2006). By contrast to the other approaches,
the notion of cellular context is made an explicit part of the
design strategy from the start, and strategically factored in
to such challenges as the ‘‘the functional deﬁnition of
devices and modules,’’ and the ‘‘rational redesign and
directed evolution for system optimization.’’ The purpose of
such contextual considerations is to make biological engi-
neering modular and predictable at the level of cell popu-
lations as well as individual cells (Andrianantoandro et al.
2006). The Weiss, Arkin, and Anderson labs are distinctive
in that they are oriented so as to pose and answer question of
the limits of standardization, while at the same time
designing speciﬁed research projects that are addressed to
real-world problems as well as applications that contribute
to their solution.
Human practices: moral contract
Although there are often no explicit statements in the
manifestos, personal communications and closer examin-
ations of scientiﬁc articles reveal an underlying ethical
substrate in which developments in science and signiﬁcant
medical issues are combined in commitment to the com-
mon good. The funding of a series of research projects
reveals a connection and a commitment to medical issues.
For example, a project at the Weiss lab funded by the
Cystic Fibrosis Foundation explores signaling systems in
bacterial populations so as to design biological interven-
tions that would down-regulate the production of microbial
bioﬁlm, a source of great distress for CF patients.
A characteristic approach to issues of Human Practices is
in the line of the alliance between patient groups and genome
sequencing that was prominent in the 1990s. This alliance
consists of patient groups providing funding for research
projects that, while not being immediately therapeutic or
instrumental, hold a plausible promise of identifying and
characterizing the underlying biological conditions within
which pathologies develop. Moral commitments are addres-
sed in the form of contractual arrangements wherein research
results are made available to more clinically oriented spe-
cialists in return for funding (Rabinow 1999).
An externality of this moral-contract approach to human
practices is that when there are fundamental shifts or
blockages, or for that matter successes, there is frequently
no built-in capacity for adjustment between the contractual
parties. Consequently, the arrangement either dissolves or
must be renegotiated. The researcher in this arrangement is
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nization; if his or her own research ramiﬁes in other
directions, other sources of funding must be found.
A critical limitation of this approach is the tacit asser-
tion that paying the price of externalities frees the research
program from having to build collaborative venues within
which Human Practices can function as an integral element
of research design and priorities. There are parallels to this
critical limitation in the recent past: the sequencing pro-
jects positioned Human Practices downstream and outside
of the design of their own research programs; the parts-
based approaches have included Human Practices at the
discursive level, but have not involved them in the shift to
research programs; the pathways approach has designed
and implemented interfaces with Human Practices spe-
cialists, but this is cooperative and non-recursive; and
synthetic genomic design approaches seek to convert all
security problems to technical problems as a way of
retaining autonomy (Table 1).
Beyond genes and social consequences: a human
practices challenge
What is at stake in synthetic biology’s shift from manifestos
to research programs? What is the best way to understand
them? And how is this shift taking place in Human Prac-
tices? In the wake of the various genome sequencing pro-
jects of the 1990s, the life sciences are being reconﬁgured
(Gibson et al. 2008; Baker et al. 2006; Rabinow 2002;
Brenner 2000). Such reorganization is premised on the
assumption that new research infrastructures for post-
genomic biology are required to facilitate the design and
composition of novel biological systems calibrated to
deliver solutions for pressing contemporary issues: cheaper
therapeutics, biofuels, mechanisms of bio-security, and a
cleaner environment. To date, however, these new infra-
structures have frequently lacked (and neglected) adequate
corresponding research infrastructures for the human sci-
ences, including ethics.
Historically, the signal achievement of bioethics was its’
development of practices, procedures and principles cali-
brated to speciﬁc problems (protection of human subjects in
research, issues of justice, the need for bureaucratic norms
for health care, etc.) (Jonsen 2003). The founders of both
American and European bioethics were keenly aware that
this calibration of a mode of ethics and problems, in turn,
entailed the construction of speciﬁc new venues (e.g. IRBs),
distinct modes of collaboration (e.g. advisory government
commissions), and particular types of inquiry (e.g. the rise
of bioethics as a discipline). Today, it seems not only
appropriate—but scientiﬁcally and ethically mandatory—to
consider in what ways these bioethical practices and venues
remain adequate to current conditions, and in what way they
require augmentation (Schmidt et al. 2009; Parens et al.
2008; O’Malley et al. 2008; Kleinman et al. 1999). Since
the development of the Human Genome Project’s ELSI
program work in bioethics has frequently rendered the
relation of problems and venues invisible or tacit. As such,
as changes have taken place at the level of the objects and
modes of organization in the biosciences, some practitio-
ners have not shown a strong inclination to animate new,
more appropriate and effective modes of production.
After the completion of the Human Genome Sequencing
projects, it became clear to most observers (and many
participants) that the nucleotide sequences themselves were
neither the ‘‘Holy Grail’’ nor the ‘‘Code of Codes’’ that the
proponents of the projects hoped they would be. Nor were
these seemingly endless strings of base pairs the key to
‘‘playing God’’ or ‘‘Franken-futures,’’ as opponents warned
(Shreeve 2005; Brenner 2000; Keller 2000). By the early
years of the twenty-ﬁrst century, whatever work these
analogies had originally been designed to do, they had
become outmoded and mis-leading. It is now clear that the
sequence information is one of the most important foun-
dational elements—necessary but hardly sufﬁcient—for
constructing a contemporary biology (Rabinow and Dan
Cohen 2005). What was missing most conspicuously was a
credible scientiﬁc program for moving from the hope (and
desire) that bio-informatics would provide the technological
Table 1 Comparative table of research programs in synthetic biology
Problem Analogy Venue Human practice Externality/critical limitation
Parts Standardizing biological
units
Computer systems iGEM Regulated
commons
Non-enforceable venue
Pathways Designing synthetic
pathways
Microbial chemical
factories
Agile assemblage Cooperative
specialists
Non-recursive pathways
Genomes Designed genomic platforms Cloning Lab Fab (building
prototypes)
Safety-by design Technological reductionism
Systems Regularizing biological
cybernetics
Heuristic use Traditional Moral contract Insufﬁcient attention to
collaboration
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molecular information to a more closely calibrated strategy
for laboratory experimentation in the near future. Correla-
tively, an honest inspection revealed an even bigger gap
between the overﬂow of information and its promised
transformation into ameliorative and lucrative applications.
Finally, there was an amorphous but haunting awareness
that what was required ultimately was a ﬁrmer scientiﬁc
understanding of the material under consideration, an
explanatory frame adequate to biological structure and
function beyond suggestive statistical correlations and
broad generalizations about life.
This over-abundance of data and under-determination of
its signiﬁcance yielded a surfeit of visions cum manifestos.
The manifestos were driven by the need to articulate and
defend a new mission for the large bureaucracies and their
costly technologies and facilities that had been constructed
as part of the sequencing projects, by a drive to attract
venture capitalists; by a drive to develop and implement
research strategies that would be scientiﬁcally and ﬁnan-
cially rewarding, etc. The hectic activity devoted to
deﬁning the framing and analogical correlatives of a con-
vincing post-sequencing orientation goes some way to
situating the effervescent (and largely evanescent) efforts
to brand and promote proteomics, systems biology, gene
ontology, synthetic biology, and the like, as the crucial next
stage in bringing into existence the hoped for wonder and
bounty of a biologically based future of knowledge, health,
and wealth, that had been so forcefully articulated and
promoted by the proponents of the sequencing projects.
Equally signiﬁcantly, but with less hoopla, by 2007 the
ethics initiatives which had come into existence as part of
the sequencing projects—the ELSI (Ethical, Legal, and
Social Implications) programs—were also beginning to be
critically scrutinized (Jonsen 2003; Rabinow 2002; Evans
2001; Cook-Deegan 1995). These programs were consti-
tuted according to the terms of a political agreement among
the Human Genome Project funders that ELSI would be
supported on condition that it operated downstream of the
science and technology, and should concern itself primarily
with framing social consequences. In the U.S., demand for
re-thinking this approach has come in part from the funders
of the 30 odd centers in nano-technology and now in syn-
thetic biology, i.e. the U.S. Congress and the National
Science Foundation. At the E.C. and in the U.K., similar
initiatives are underway. The E.C., in its 7th framework
program, for example, has made it mandatory for new
projects in synthetic biology to include specialists on safety,
security, and ethics as collaborative partners from the out-
set. In the U.K., to cite another example,synthetic biologists
at Imperial College are constituting a joint research pro-
gram with social scientists at the London School of
Economics.
Hence, a shared challenge now exists in parallel to the
challenge of constituting a program for post-sequencing
biology: what form should be given to synthetic biology
research programs such that they incorporate collaboration
with human scientists? Said another way, if today there is a
broad consensus that the genome sequences were not the
key to life, only the ‘‘end of the beginning’’ of biology as
Sydney Brenner put it, then it follows logically at least that
the ELSI programs, that were constructed within the
political and scientiﬁc consensus about the signiﬁcance of
the genome sequencing projects, while continuing to pro-
vide useful safeguards and as venues for conducting public
conversations, are themselves limited in their scope by
their original mandate to operate downstream and outside
of the sequencing efforts (Brenner 2000).
Agreeing with Brenner that there is a compelling need
for scientists to rethink their understanding of the gene,w e
argue in a parallel fashion that there is an equally if not
more compelling need to rethink the cornerstone concept of
ELSI—social consequences. The need for rethinking what
is meant by social consequences is actually more compel-
ling because while it is habitual for the biological sciences
that outdated concepts, techniques, and infrastructures will
sooner or later be replaced, there is no guarantee whatso-
ever that a parallel process exists for the human sciences.
Such concept work begins with recognizing that the
term ‘‘social consequences’’ itself is rhetorically mislead-
ing and conceptually inadequate. None of the programs or
Centers for synthetic biology are being funded by the U.S.
or European governments in order to engage in the
untrammeled pursuit of knowledge. As with the Human
Genome Project they were established to keep sectors of
the economy and its scientiﬁc and technological base at the
forefront of an ever more competitive global playing ﬁeld.
Scholarship has demonstrated for decades that science and
technology are formed by, and ramiﬁes across broader and
more tightly connected communities than the downstream
positioning entailed in the notion of social consequences
accommodates (Daston and Galison 2007; Galison 1987;
Latour and Woolgar 1979).
We propose that a more conceptually adequate term
would be Human Practices ‘‘ramiﬁcations.’’ To ramify
means to produce differentiated trajectories from previous
determinations. This unmooring from previous determina-
tions produces unexpected effects that may complicate a
situation or make the desired result more difﬁcult to
achieve. One advantage of this term is that, unlike social
consequences, it does not imply a downstream positioning
of ethics and the human sciences, that would impose an
arbitrary hierarchy in which research somehow takes place
outside of the conditions and constraints of the larger
community. Current strategies for addressing the persistent
inequality of power between the biological and human
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123sciences, such as SynBERC’s Human Practices, position
ethics ‘‘upstream’’ and ‘‘mid-stream’’ in its execution and
deliverables (Khushf 2007; Rabinow and Bennett 2007;
Fisher et al. 2006; Wilsdon and Willis 2004). This posi-
tioning, it is argued, is more adequate to the challenge of
establishing human scientists as equal and collaborative
stakeholders. Moreover, such positioning supports the
critical work of documenting and analyzing the actual
ethical and social as well as technical and organizational
ramiﬁcations of research as they unfold.
Of course many other things will follow from scientiﬁc
developments: discoveries, blockages, power struggles,
patents, career moves, etc. Some of these will be planned
others not, some predictable others not, some desirable
others less so. All of this will depend in large part on the
degree of success or failure to achieve results, to meet
milestones, to raise money, etc. It is more rigorous to
analyze this situation not simply as the cause-and-effect
consequences of the production of truth claims in engi-
neering disciplines, but as ramiﬁcations to be analyzed and
refashioned. Upon reﬂection, it is obvious that the very
same scientiﬁc or technological results could be taken up
and mobilized in many different directions. Thus, the
object of Human Practices research is ramiﬁcations not
consequences; its method is observational and analytic; its
mode is collaborative.
There is a well-established body of scholarship in Eur-
ope and the U.S. insisting that contemporary post-genomic
research programs can no longer be constituted as they
were in the recent past, although many pragmatic obstacles
remain in place.
4 Moreover, there is growing agreement
that the challenges of rethinking ‘‘the gene’’ and rethinking
‘‘social consequences’’ as a linked set of problems can no
longer being ignored (Ganguli-Mitra et al. 2009; Rabinow
and Bennett 2008a; Khushf 2007; Barben et al. 2007; Rose
et al. 2006; Nowotny et al. 2001). Interdisciplinary science
and Human Practices must be brought into a more pro-
ductive adjacency if we are to inﬂect post-genomic biology
in a more democratic and ethical fashion (Jasanoff 2005;
Hayden 2003; Guston 2000; Lash et al. 1996; Rip et al.
1995). But how to make this task collaborative and syn-
ergistic, given enduring power inequalities and entrenched
dispositions, remains a challenge. The problem is to con-
ceive of new venues in which such collaboration might
take place, and to invent the techniques of research and
remediation that the demands of the day require.
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